Tackling climate change with technology

Tackling climate change with technology

• Power
• Transport
• Engineering

New technologies will be required if the world economy is to grow without accelerating climate change.

Since the industrial revolution, economic growth has gone hand in hand with the consumption of fossil fuels and the release of ever greater amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere - leading many scientists and politicians to call now for a new, technological revolution. Here we survey options for power-generation and transport, and also engineering solutions to reflect sunlight or remove CO2 from the atmosphere.

Fuel About Pros Cons Viability Clean coal Range of technologies to pre-treat coal to reduce emissions, burn it more efficiently, or capture and store carbon emissions. Most abundant and widely distributed fossil fuel. Preserves existing industry and makes use of existing infrastructure. Uses more coal per kWh than normal coal power. Produces some pollutants, such as heavy metals. Coal is a finite resource. Small-scale trials under way. Huge investment(c $3trn) needed by 2050. Estimated cost: 5-13 cents/kWh (double normal coal). Geothermal Uses naturally hot rocks, or temperature differences, beneath Earth's surface to heat water directly or drive turbines. Constant renewable energy source in some locations. Highly efficient for heating living spaces. Long hardware lifetime. Underground heat only available in some locations. Energy can "dry up" for years. Can in some locations release toxic gases. Currently less than 1% of global capacity. US and Australia investing in new technologies. Estimated cost: 5-11 cents/kWh. Nuclear Harnesses energy from the controlled splitting of atoms, releasing heat that is harvested to drive turbines. Significant historical experience and technology developed. Can provide heat and electricity. Plentiful fuel supplies. Perceived as risky. Strong opposition from green campaigners. Creates radioactive waste. Fuel can be weapons security risk. Set for a comeback after years in shadow. New reactors behind schedule. Disputed cost. One estimate: 4-8 cents/kWh. Marine Exploits energy of shifting tides, underwater currents, or shoreline and offshore waves. Large and infinitely renewable resource. Tidal energy very regular. Can be exploited on small or large scale. No consensus on best means to capture energy. Large projects may disrupt natural water flow, tides and ecosystems. Little expected before 2030. Technology uncertain, so wide cost range: 15-30 cents/KWh (double or triple coal). Wind Using the wind, on land or at sea, to drive turbines. Significant experience and mature industry and infrastructure. Infinitely renewable resource. Can be deployed in range of project sizes. Intermittent resource. Not efficient for all locations. Windfarms interrupt radar signals, can be noisy and regarded by some as unsightly. Currently about 1% of global supply. Onshore cheaper than offshore. High energy storage costs are handicap. Quite low cost: 7-14 cents/kWh. Solar Gathers energy from sunlight, using light to generate electricity directly (photovoltaic) or to heat liquids to drive a turbine. Infinitely renewable and most abundant zero-carbon resource. Silent and no effects on local environment. Like wind and marine, intermittent. Current photovoltaic designs complex; if widely used, chemicals could become scarce. US investing heavily, EU planning plant in Africa. Cost still high (13-35 cents/kWh) but expected to fall. Price of solar panels falling. Hydroelectric Generates electricity by damming water and constraining flow through turbines. Most widely deployed renewable strategy. Well-established as a large-scale energy source. Can also be used for energy storage if run in reverse. Dams disrupt ecosystems and are a public health risk if they burst. Can trap decaying matter that creates pollution. One of the cheapest forms of electricity. Development focusing on small hydro-electric power. Estimated cost: 2-6 cents/kWh. Source: Costings from IEA

Transport	About	Pros	Cons	Viability
Hydrogen Road, Rail	Hydrogen can be burned in combustion engines or used to drive fuel cells that combine it with oxygen to produce electricity.	It's clean - the only waste product is pure water - and it's the most abundant element in the universe.	Hydrogen production is energy-intensive, often using fossil fuels or biomass. Flammable nature raises storage and transport risks.	It's too early to give an accurate estimate of cost. The US National Research Council says $55bn needs to be spent on R&D.
Electric Road	Transport can run on electricity stored in batteries, or in next-generation storage devices called supercapacitors.	Mechanically simple, and newer electric motors very efficient. Existing power grid can be used as basis for charging infrastructure.	Much depends on how electricity is produced. From a carbon-intensive source, overall emissions may be higher than petrol.	Far cheaper than petrol per mile but cost of battery makes cars more expensive. Also requires entirely new infrastructure.
Biofuel Road, Rail, Ships, Air	Fuels made from plant matter or organic waste. Bioethanol, from sugar-rich crops such as maize, used in place of petrol.	Biofuel blends can be used in existing cars. Second generation fuels will make use of waste biomass such as seeds or husks.	Growing and cropping biofuels burns carbon - maybe more than they save. Grown on arable land that could be used to grow food.	Cost comparable to petrol - sometimes cheaper, depending on oil price. Effect on food prices needs to be factored in.
Alternative Rail, Ships	Alternatives include the burning or pyrolysis (heating) of municipal waste. Pyrolysis results in a combustible gas or oil, and more heat.	Many alternative fuels' greatest advantage is that they utilise something that would otherwise go to landfill.	A dense waste product may result. Amount of CO2 saved varies, depending on method of combustion and type of fuel used.	Waste fuel technology is at an early stage of development, but experts say it could be competitive with other fuels in 10 years.

Scientists have been looking for ways of modifying the Earth's environment to control global warming - it's known as geo-engineering.

One way to do this is simply to reflect more of the sun's light, changing the Earth's reflectivity, or albedo.

This could be attempted using vast, flexible space reflectors (1) placed in orbit around the Earth. Alternatively, various types of "stratospheric aerosols" could be released in the upper atmosphere (2) to scatter some light back out into space. Earth-bound reflectors (3) could do the same.

Another approach is to directly reduce the atmospheric carbon that, among other things, leads to temperature rises. This could be done by "fertilising" the ocean , stimulating the uptake of carbon by surface algae that would eventually sink to the ocean floor. Exposing the surfaces of carbonate and silicate rocks in "enhanced weathering" could provide a place for carbon to be absorbed. Another frequently mentioned proposal is the capture of carbon dioxide from the air using "artificial trees", followed by liquefaction and storage, probably in underground reservoirs. There is no single geo-engineering "silver bullet" that should be pursued as an all-encompassing solution to climate change, says the UK's Royal Society in its analysis of the cost of a range of proposals compared with their efficacy. Stratospheric aerosols seem to offer the most effect for the least investment, and could be deployed soon, but present an unknown risk to the environment. Changes to desert surface albedo are projected to be more effective than ocean fertilisation, but both could change delicate ecosystems in unexpected ways.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8338853.stm

Thank You, G2

Why the U.S.-China relationship is not only the fulcrum of the world economy, but a good thing after all.

Nov 17, 2009

Since the end of the Cold War, big strategic thinkers have been longing for an enemy worthy of their big strategic brains. Many have tried hard to turn China into one. In the late '90s, Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's near-legendary chief of "net assessment" and the last of the Truman-era Cold Warriors, directed a study that called for a wholesale reallocation of military assets away from Europe and toward Asia. In the view of Pentagon planners, the new Fulda Gap—the region where Soviet troops were poised to invade Western Europe during the Cold War—would be the South China Sea, a key "chokepoint" that the Chinese might some day seek to control. The prominent realist scholar John Mearsheimer argued that if China continued "modernizing at a rapid pace," it "would surely pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in the western hemisphere during the nineteenth century." His potted prescription: America should not only withdraw from engagement but slow down China's growth. (Click here to follow Michael Hirsh).

The debate, fortunately, has moved somewhat beyond those simplistic, stuck-in-the-last-war views of the U.S.-China relationship. But it hasn't moved far enough. Today's grand strategic critiques tend to focus on economics—the staggering imbalances between China's capital surpluses and America's deficits—while still using Cold War terminology. That's why, in 2004, Larry Summers, then president of Harvard, described the relationship between America and China and Japan, the largest holders of U.S. debt, as "a kind of balance of financial terror." New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, in the latest iteration of this approach, urged President Obama to talk tough to Beijing about currency during his first visit to China this week in order to avoid "a potentially ugly confrontation." Krugman said the Chinese were deliberately keeping their currency weak as part of a strategy of "beggar-thy-neighbor devaluation" that would allow China to maintain its export might. Beijing's aim is to appease its own population with continued high economic growth while doing nothing to help ease America's double-digit unemployment, and that's a "dangerous game," Krugman warned.

Is it? China's game of cheating at the margins of the system by playing with its currency misses a much bigger point. Step back a moment. The larger story that has unfolded in the year since the biggest economic disaster since the Depression—an era that led to near-total breakdown and world war—is just how intact the international system remains. "We've never had a situation where we've been at such risk but at the same time the major powers have acted so responsibly as adults," says Richard Medley, who was formerly chief political adviser at Soros Fund Management and chief economist for the House Banking Committee and now manages successful hedge funds. "I'm very impressed by the Chinese, by the Americans, by the British, and even a few of the Europeans." Trade has dropped precipitously but not broken down. There is no great surge of protectionism, or virulent nationalism. On the contrary, a cautious and polite debate is taking place about reforming the global financial system (too cautious, in fact, many critics say).

Most of all, Medley says, the main motor of the world economy and global system—the "G2," America and China—is a continuing source of stability. "The G2 is evolving and both sides are doing an adult job of letting it evolve," he says. So much so that the third great source of world growth, the European Union, is getting a bit jealous. In the latest of a never-ending series of calls for an always-fractious Europe to unite itself, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband warned late last month that the EU risked becoming "spectators in a G2 world shaped by the U.S. and China." A few weeks later, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini also admonished his fellow continentals: "If we do not find a common foreign policy, there is the risk that Europe will become irrelevant ... We will be bypassed by the G2 of America and China, which is to say the Pacific axis, and the Atlantic axis will be forgotten."

All this is not only entertaining but marvelously healthy: a war of words that has no chance of becoming a real war. The G2 itself is not necessarily in a happy place, of course: at their fairly sober summit meeting on Tuesday, Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao seemed to disagree on climate change and attempts to sanction Iran over its nuclear program, which Hu did not endorse. Hu even gave Obama a free-market poke by suggesting America was encouraging protectionism with its imposition of tariffs on tires and steel pipes. But the differences were muted and for good reason: it's in the consummate interest of both leaders to keep them that way. When Obama, in his Shanghai town-hall meeting Monday, declared that "power in the 21st century is no longer a zero-sum game," he was speaking a prosaic yet profound truth about the relationship between the current superpower and the emerging one. Yes, the U.S. and Chinese economies are so integrated that to disentangle them would mean a kind of "mutual assured destruction," or MAD (to resurrect another Cold War term). But that's a good MAD, not a bad MAD. The global system resembles, in fact, more of a "mutual aid society," as Princeton scholar John Ikenberry puts it. No country, not even would-be rogues like Iran and (possibly) Russia, has found a way around the iron law of this benign global order: in order to be influential or powerful, a nation must be prosperous; in order to be prosperous, its economy must take part in the international system; in order to take part effectively in the international system, even countries with dramatically different political and social systems, like America and China, must act according to a set of strict norms. There is no other choice. "To be successful today, a major nation has to join the World Trade Organization," says Ikenberry.

Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese supreme leader, may not have understood the full implications of what he was doing when he began to open up the Chinese economy in 1978. Deng was just trying to avoid the fate of the failing "command economy" of the Soviet Union. It didn't matter what color a cat was, Deng said, as long as it caught mice. What that meant, in the koanlike rhetoric of Chinese politics, was that if private enterprise works, we'll try it. Was this all part of a 100-year plan, as some hardline U.S. analysts of China still suspect, to overcome and dominate the United States using its own economic methods? Who knows? But if so, it's unlikely the Chinese mandarins will ever succeed in carrying out that plan, for the simple reason that, to a degree they never could have anticipated, they have been permanently co-opted into the system.

This is somewhat analogous to what happened to Japan in the last century. Japan waged war twice in the 20th century, first with ships, planes, and armies, then with trade. But as Japan's economy matured, after years of relentless pressure to open up Japan's markets and change its practices, Tokyo's bureaucratic and business elite began touting the concept of kyosei, or "symbiosis" with Western economies. Japanese multinationals began setting up production abroad, in the United States, to avoid trade sanctions on exports, and in Asia, to escape the high-priced labor of their own maturing economy. The result was that Japan began losing its "Inc."—the interests of the nation and its giant corporations started to diverge. The Mitsubishis, Toyotas, and Matsushitas, the pride of Japan's postwar rebirth, began joining the great multinational diaspora. Thanks to globalized production, Japanese companies, to a startling degree, have become "us" rather than "them."

And that's where the Chinese are headed as well, if we have the patience to coax them there. Eventually—and maybe it will take another hundred years—as the population grows wealthier, the Chinese will begin consuming more normally, introducing more balance to capital flows. (Perhaps even more than the Japanese have: China's is a more naturally capitalist culture than Japan's.) The global system may not be pretty; no grand strategic thinker ever would have designed it this way. But it is working. So let's hope Barack Obama has the wisdom to leave well enough alone.

Michael Hirsh is also the author of At War with Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World

Mutant genes 'key to long life'

Mutant genes 'key to long life'

There is a clear link between living to 100 and inheriting a hyperactive version of an enzyme that prevents cells from ageing, researchers say.

Scientists from the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in the US say centenarian Ashkenazi Jews have this mutant gene.

They found that 86 very old people and their children had higher levels of telomerase which protects the DNA.

They say it may be possible to produce drugs that stimulate the enzyme.

" There may be a downside to the plan of boosting the repair processes of DNA because giving the cells more chances to divide may increase the chances of damaging mutations developing and causing cancer. "
Professor Tim Spector, King's College

Writing in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the team say they studied the Ashkenazi Jewish community because they are closely related so it is easier to identify disease causing genetic differences.

They took blood samples from 86 very old, but generally healthy, people with an average age of 97; 175 of their offspring; and 93 other people who were the offspring of parents who had lived a normal lifespan and could therefore make up a control group, with which the results could be compared.

Role of telomeres

Telomeres are relatively short sections of specialized DNA that sit at the ends of all our chromosomes.

They have been compared to the plastic tips at the ends of shoelaces that prevent the laces from unravelling.

Each time a cell divides, its telomeres shorten and the cell becomes more susceptible to dying.

The importance of telomeres was recognised last month when three scientists received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for determining the structure of telomeres and discovering how they protect chromosomes from degrading.

Telomerase can repair the telomeres, preventing them from shrinking.

'Strongly heritable'

The team at Einstein found that the centenarians and their offspring had higher levels of telomerase and significantly longer telomeres than the unrelated people in the control group and that the trait was strongly heritable.

The scientists had previously shown that individuals in Ashkenazi families with exceptional longevity have generally been spared major age-related diseases, like heart disease and diabetes.

The centenarians in this study had a lower average body mass index than the controls and higher levels of good (HDL) cholesterol.

Yousin Suh, associate professor of medicine and genetics at Einstein and a lead author on the paper, said: "Our findings suggest that telomere length and variants of telomerase genes combine to help people live very long lives, perhaps by protecting them from the diseases of old age.

"We're now trying to understand the mechanism by which these genetic variants of telomerase maintain telomere length in centenarians.

"It may be possible to develop drugs that mimic the telomerase that our centenarians have been blessed with."

'Downside'

Professor Tim Spector, from King's College London, who has been researching telomeres and ageing, said it was an interesting finding but it may not apply to other populations and further research was needed.

He said: "There may be a downside to the plan of boosting the repair processes of DNA because giving the cells more chances to divide may increase the chances of damaging mutations developing and causing cancer.

"Most scientists agree that there is evidence that people with long telomeres have less age-related diseases and this study does suggest that could be one reason why they are living longer."

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/health/8359735.stm

Published: 2009/11/15 00:15:29 GMT

All change as gas reserves soar

All change as gas reserves soar

By Jorn Madslien
Business reporter, BBC News, Stavanger

With coal being too dirty and wind farms and nuclear power plants arriving late, it seems the world is left with a stark choice: keep on polluting or turn out the lights.

Unless, that is, someone comes up with an alternative.

Energy executive Rune Bjornson thinks he has the answer.

"Natural gas, more than any other fuel, is an option we have here and now," he tells the BBC in an interview.

And, he adds, there is plenty of it around - unlike scarcer resources such as oil and coal.

Given that Mr Bjornson heads up the gas division at the Norwegian energy giant Statoil, it comes as no surprise that he should hail the virtues of gas.

" We look at shale gas as a potential game changer "
Rune Bjornson, head of gas division, Statoil

But he is not alone in his predictions.

In June this year, the Potential Gas Committee, which is connected with the Colorado School of Mines, raised its estimate of gas reserves in the US by 35% to 2,074 trillion cubic feet (58.74 trillion cubic metres), the highest reserves since the group started tracking the information 44 years ago.

The upgrade came after new technology made it easier and cheaper to extract gas from shale rock, a prehistoric clay, which has hitherto been deemed too expensive and tricky to recover.

The implications for global power balances could be enormous, in both the energy and the geopolitical sense.

What next?

Upgraded shale gas reserves are particularly relevant ahead of the Copenhagen summit, as it could help the world meet the Kyoto targets for carbon emission cuts, Mr Bjornson insists.

"Gas has very low carbon emissions when compared with many other energy sources," he says.

Indeed, he insists, gas - whether offshore gas reserves or from shale rock - is "not competing with" tomorrow's technologies.

The need to reduce emissions from energy production means nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, as well as wind and other renewable energy sources, will become leading power suppliers in the future as current energy production becomes unsustainable, Mr Bjornson predicts.

"It is no longer a question of whether climate change is real or not," he says. "That was yesterday's discussion. Now, it is a question of what we do next."

But while the world waits for wind farms, nuclear power plants and carbon storage facilities to be built, gas could deliver vast reductions in emissions, Mr Bjornson says.

"If Europe was to convert all coal-fired power stations to gas they would reduce emissions by 40%," he claims, pointing to how gas power stations emit about about a third less than modern coal-fired power stations and about two-thirds less than old ones.

Plenty of gas

Peter Dea, chief executive of Cirque Resources in Denver, Colorado, goes further.

" If you're not in on these plays, Wall Street says 'well, what's the matter with you guys?' "
Arthur Berman, Geological consultant

He believes gas could not only replace coal as the main source of electricity in the US, it could deliver fuel for America's cars as well.

His optimism is based on a the Potential Gas Committee's estimate, which suggests the US has a 100-year supply of gas.

New techniques have been developed, where liquid, chemicals and sand is injected horizontally into shale rock to break open pathways for the gas to leak to the surface.

The shale gas reserves are expected to boost economic growth, help reduce carbon emissions and reduce US dependence on energy imports, Mr Dea predicts.

"It is truly a win-win-win situation," he says.

'Game changer'

Eager to take part in this development, Statoil last autumn joined forces with Chesapeake Energy to extract shale gas from the North East, Marcellus foundation that stretches across Pennsylvania and New York State.

" As shale gas fields come on line in the next five years, it is likely that European prices will drop in half "
Paul Sterne, managing partner of mergers and acquisitions advisers Sterne & Co

"It has come as a surprise to the industry that the reserves were so good and that it was competitive in terms of cost," Mr Bjornson says.

"We look at shale gas as a potential game changer."

And not only in the US. "We believe there are huge resources in others areas, including Europe," Mr Bjornson says.

Shale reserves are believed to be vast in Poland, Germany, France and Sweden, and there could also be similarly enormous shale gas areas in India and China.

"But it hasn't gotten much attention," says Mr Bjornson. "It is an industry that is still young."

Exaggerated hopes?

Sceptics say there are good reasons why.

Arthur Berman, who was speaking at a recent energy conference in Denver, is one of them.

The Texas-based geological consultant believes the latest estimates are vastly exaggerated and suggests the shale gas reserves are neither as large as nor as profitable as many in the industry predict.

But "in the midst of a boom or a bubble, it's hard to sit on the sidelines", he says.

"If you're not in on these plays, Wall Street says 'well, what's the matter with you guys?'"

Others point to how shale gas extraction can damage the environment as the chemicals used in the pressure-washer style drilling methods can leak into the ground water.

Energy security

Such sceptical voices do not ring loud in energy circles, however.

Advocates argue that the ability of shale gas to help curb carbon emissions makes it a worthy, and in macroeconomic terms worthwhile, risk to take.

But what is really exciting executives and policy makers alike is shale's potential to unseat leading natural gas suppliers such as Russia, Iran, Qatar and Algeria from their dominant positions, elevating the US, Europe, India and China into pole positions.

This could help improve energy security across the world, leaving few countries reliant on gas imports from countries often governed by unstable regimes.

It could also hit current energy exporters where it hurts, namely in their wallets, as new gas sources send energy supplies soaring thus depressing prices across the world.

Falling prices

Already, there are signs of such developments in the US, where natural gas is priced at up to $4 per million British thermal units - equivalent to crude priced at about $23 a barrel. (A barrel of crude contains on average $5.80 MBTU).

That is a seasonal rise from an average spot price of $2.50 during summer 2009, sharply down from 2008 when rising shale gas supplies pushed the average gas spot price down from almost $14 to about £10 per MBTU.

"Longer-term, the cost of producing shale gas is estimated at about $6 per MBTU, equivalent to crude priced at $34.80 per barrel," observes Paul Sterne, managing partner of mergers and acquisitions advisers Sterne & Co, in an article published by Ground Report.

"Unconventional gas will exert downward pressure on energy prices for years to come," predicts Mr Sterne - in the US, as well as elsewhere.

"As shale gas fields come on line in the next five years, it is likely that European prices will drop in half."

Winners and losers

Consumers might find that an appealing prospect, particularly in some of the world's poorest countries. Such sharp price falls should go a long way to relieve fuel poverty and indeed hunger.

But elsewhere, notably in Russia, many ordinary people could also see their lives transformed in less-than-desirable ways as it could lead to a painful reversal of the country's recent economic prosperity, which was based largely on highly-priced gas and oil exports.

The geopolitical implications are both obvious and enormous, so it is far from certain that a sharp and sudden rise in global gas supplies will be a blessing rather than a curse.

But if the gas is there, do not expect such concerns to prevent it from being extracted.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/8303581.stm

Published: 2009/11/08 17:43:14 GMT

© BBC MMIX

Islão na Europa Os suíços têm medo dos minaretes e não são os únicos na Europa

Islão na Europa
Os suíços têm medo dos minaretes e não são os únicos na Europa

Uma torre não é só uma torre, quer se erga no cimo de um castelo, de uma mesquita ou de uma igreja. Um minarete não é nem nunca foi só uma torre. Na Europa, tem-se tornado num dos símbolos de tensão entre grupos de não muçulmanos, que vêem os crentes do islão como estranhos à sua cultura e identidade, e comunidades muçulmanas que, cada vez mais integradas e orgulhosas, querem dar visibilidade aos seus templos.


Os 400 mil muçulmanos da Suíça têm 180 locais de culto, a maioria em edifícios industriais ou salas, "soluções improvisadas sem representatividade exterior, longe dos bairros simpáticos", diz Andreas Tunger-Zanetti, do Centro de Investigação em Religião da Universidade de Lucerne. Só há quatro mesquitas com minaretes no país e em nenhum local de culto se ouve o muezzin, a chamada para a oração.

Mas, nos últimos anos, os muçulmanos de pequenas cidades da Suíça alemã decidiram pedir autorização para construir novas mesquitas com minaretes. Primeiro, alguns habitantes começaram a recolher assinaturas contra as torres. Depois, o Partido do Povo Suíço (SVP) resolveu coordenar uma campanha nacional. Como na Suíça 100 mil assinaturas chegam para convocar um referendo, no dia 29 os eleitores serão chamados a votar. Se disserem "sim", a frase "a construção de minaretes é proibida" será acrescentada à Constituição, a mesma que prevê a liberdade religiosa.

As sondagens dão vantagem ao "não" - 51 por cento contra 35 por cento -, mas o debate e as suas potenciais cicatrizes estão para ficar.

Os promotores da campanha descrevem as torres como símbolo da "intolerância islâmica". "Se queremos impedir a sharia [lei islâmica], temos de proibir os minaretes", explicou Walter Wobmann, um deputado do SVP, citado na imprensa local.

Em causa, portanto, não estão os muçulmanos, mas a sua aparente determinação em islamizar a Suíça, sustentam. Tunger-Zanetti também não acredita que a questão tenha a ver com a presença de muçulmanos, mas com a tomada de consciência de que o islão não está de passagem: "A construção de um minarete indica que a comunidade vai ficar. É isso que a sociedade suíça só agora está a perceber", disse ao PÚBLICO.

Num estudo intitulado "Conflitos sobre Mesquitas na Europa", promovido pela Network of European Foundations e dirigido pelo sociólogo Stefano Allievi, conclui-se que nos últimos 20 anos as mesquitas (ou os minaretes) geraram "cada vez mais e mais frequentes disputas, mesmo em países onde estes conflitos não existiam e as mesquitas já estavam presentes".

Isso acontece independentemente da relação de cada país com o islão - nas nações onde o islão chegou nos seus primeiros séculos, nos países que colonizaram nações muçulmanas ou naqueles onde o islão quase só chegou através da imigração, no século XX.

Os conflitos crescem, "mesmo em países onde o processo de inclusão já fez mais caminho", escreve Allievi. Muitas vezes, os aspectos questionados não são visíveis ou sequer existentes nos países em que estas tensões irrompem. Diferentes acontecimentos, fruto de fundamentalismos mais ou menos locais, tornaram-se tema global. A fawta (édito religioso) contra Salman Rushdie veio do Irão, os cartoons de Maomé provocaram protestos em países muçulmanos, alguns suicidas do 11 de Setembro viviam na Europa, Theo van Gogh foi assassinado na Holanda, houve ataques em Londres e Madrid, o hijab (lenço islâmico) foi debatido até onde é pouco comum.

Na Suíça, sustenta Tunger-Zanetti, os promotores da campanha antiminaretes alimentam-se "de um desconforto generalizado com alguns fenómenos associados, correcta ou incorrectamente, ao islão, como as burqas, a repressão das mulheres, a intenção de expandir a influência muçulmana". Para o conseguir, explica, "insinuam episódios ou estatísticas de países europeus ou muçulmanos, mas a cadeia de "provas" é tão fraca que não pode ser encarada como um argumento". É, "na verdade, uma expressão desse desconforto e da incapacidade que muitas pessoas têm em encontrar o seu espaço numa sociedade multicultural e multirreligiosa".



Nós e eles

As mesquitas, mais do que as mulheres de hijab que passam na rua, ficam. Os minaretes erguem-se acima de outros pontos. "O controlo do território e sobre o território não é só um facto cultural e simbólico, é também um sinal muito concreto e material de domínio e poder", escreve Stefano Allievi. O italiano conclui que neste momento da história as mesquitas produzem quase sempre conflitos induzidos por um reflexo de identidade - uma dinâmica de "nós/eles" - e que essa reacção não se verifica quando em causa estão igrejas de uma confissão diferente da dominante, sinagogas ou templos de outras religiões.

Inevitavelmente, quase todos os conflitos a propósito das mesquitas na Europa incluem "a questão do minarete, a sua altura ou a sua própria existência". O minarete, "como os arranha-céus ou a Torre de Babel, é um símbolo que se eleva no céu, um símbolo de poder, dimensão e força".

O arqueólogo Cláudio Torres lembra que "desde os zigurates na Babilónia" se valorizava "esse elevar-se, esse subir aos céus, às casas dos deuses, e por outro lado, esse marcar de poder".

Se o cristianismo inicial, uma "religião da salvação contra os poderosos", não tinha torres e era "virado para dentro", já "o mundo muçulmano surge numa época de expansão do proselitismo que passava por se mostrar". Com o feudalismo, o cristianismo torna-se religião de poder na Europa. E enquanto no mundo cristão "surgia uma torre cada vez mais afilada", a torre, "essa coisa alta e visível, onde os cristãos puseram o sino e os muçulmanos o muezzin", tornava-se no símbolo desta espécie de frente a frente. "À medida que as religiões se confrontavam, começou a confrontação das torres", diz Cláudio Torres.

Na Europa de hoje, "o minarete tornou-se no símbolo por excelência do conflito que rodeia o islão, ou a sua visibilidade - mais do que o hijab", sustenta Allievi. Para uns, é um símbolo de integração; para outros, uma demonstração inaceitável de poder.



Porcos e leis

Em Colónia, na Alemanha, onde uma iniciativa da extrema-direita contra uma mesquita desencadeou protestos e contra-manifestações em 2007, vai nascer um minarete de 55 metros, menos cinco do que os 60 da torre do sino da catedral. Em Los Bermejales, Espanha, o minarete foi reduzido a metade. Em Driebergen, Holanda, dois foram retirados após negociações com a câmara.

Em 2008, a Caríntia foi a primeira região da Áustria a aprovar uma lei que baniu os minaretes. Seguiu-se Voralberg. Outras regiões austríacas, mas também alemãs e suíças, pediram cópias da legislação.

Em Itália, dos 660 locais de culto, só três são verdadeiramente mesquitas, reconhecíveis como tal. No Norte do país, a oposição ao islão tem sido assumida pela Liga Norte: o ano passado, membros do partido levaram um porco a passear no local onde estava planeada a construção de uma mesquita, em Pádua, e o ministro Roberto Calderoli chegou a propor um "dia do porco" para protestar contra a mesquita. Manifestações semelhantes tiveram lugar na Áustria e na Suécia.

No caso dos minaretes, muitas vezes as comunidades muçulmanas acabam por aceitar diminuir a sua altura ou abdicam tranquilamente da sua construção. Como acontece com o chamamento para a oração, que quase nem chega a ser reivindicado. Em todo o caso, apesar de as leis de excepção só existirem até agora em duas regiões austríacas, o estudo de Allievi confirma que os muçulmanos tendem a ser vistos como tão "diferentes" que para uma parte da população europeia não faz sentido que as leis e as regras que se aplicam para todos lhes sirvam.

Na Suíça, mais do que os próprios muçulmanos, têm sido membros de outras religiões a falar em nome deles na defesa dos minaretes. "Os líderes da comunidade concordaram muito cedo em não dar início a uma contra-campanha. Sentem que os promotores da iniciativa tentaram provocá-los", diz Andreas Tunger-Zanetti. "Consideram, e penso que têm razão, que este debate pertence à maioria da sociedade e é sobre princípios de tolerância e liberdade de crença."